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JUDICIAL REMEDIAL ACTION IN
ZONING CASES:
AN EMERGING STANDARD FOR REVIEW
MAX J. RUTTGER, !11*
The administration of zoning laws of the several states has recently
come under increasing attack through the court system. To be sure,
attacking decisions of administrative bodies is not new to the legal
system; however, in the realm of zoning cases, the techniques now
being used differ greatly from the standard "abuse of administrative
discretion" methods of the past. And, perhaps because of the very
nature of these new techniques, courts are more receptive to the
arguments of those attacking the administration of zoning laws and
ordinances.
The heart of these new techniques appears to be something closely
approximating the once discredited substantive due process standard
that was used by the Supreme Court of the United States to strike
down maximum hour laws,1 control of discrimination for union
activities2 and minimum wage laws.3 These cases were all litigated in
the early part of this century and have all been long since overruled
by the Supreme Court.4 However, a recent New Jersey decision used
the term "substantive due process" to invalidate a zoning ordinance. 5
Most courts that have invalidated zoning ordinances in recent years
on constitutional grounds have not invoked the language of sub-
stantive due process in those terms, but the decisions seem to tacitly
accept that standard.
More important than this technique and others similar to it, how-
* B.A., Yale University, 1968; J.D., Washington University, 1972.
1. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
2. Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
3. Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
4. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941); West Coast Hotel Co.
v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917); over-
ruling, respectively, Adair; Adkins; and Lochner.
5. Cabe Collins Realty, Inc. v. City of Margate City, 112 N.J. Super. 341, 271
A.2d 430 (App. Div. 1970).
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ever, is the fact that litigants are successfully using it in courts today
to challenge zoning laws. The heart of the matter is that attacking a
zoning ordinance on constitutional grounds was essentially rejected,
in 1926, by the United States Supreme Court in the landmark case of
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.o Since that case was decided,
standard judicial reaction to actions brought to challenge zoning
ordinances or the acts of administrative zoning bodies pursuant to
those ordinances has been the "abuse of discretion" test: whether the
administrative body has acted unreasonably, arbitrarily or capri-
ciously7 Collateral constitutional attacks on ordinances were
ignored under the Euclid standard. Concurrent in time with the
myriad of civil rights cases in the courts, however, constitutional
attacks on zoning ordinances and on actions of administrative bodies
have again arisen as they did before the Euclid decision. Indeed,
lawyers for litigants in zoning cases may have sensed judicial recep-
tivity to constitutional arguments in such cases following successful
civil rights litigation. This rationale for the institution of zoning
cases on constitutional grounds leads directly into the substantive due
process standard for evaluating both zoning ordinances and acts of
administrative bodies. Not only is substantive due process the most
successful technique (vide recent civil rights cases), but it is currently
the only technique available, unless and until a court uses constitu-
tional eminent domain as a method for invalidating a zoning ordi-
nance.
To illustrate the technique of substantive due process, as applied
to a zoning case, assume a community has passed an ordinance pro-
hibiting a particular use within the city limits. A court could hold
that the prohibition itself violates due process. In contrast, if the
community adopted the ordinance but failed to follow a prescribed
procedure in doing so, the prohibition would be invalid, but only
until the community readopted the same ordinance properly. The
first technique of attack is substantive due process, the second pro-
cedural due process. A related procedural due process attack could be
used if the ordinance were properly adopted, but the community, in
passing upon a proposed use under the ordinance, failed to observe
some procedure.
6. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
7. See, e.g., Ray Schools-Chicago, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 337 Ill. App. 312,
86 N.E.2d 139 (1949).
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JUDICIAL REVIEW IN ZONING
The function of the court system, at both trial and appellate levels,
in the administration of zoning laws has nearly always been one of
review of administrative actions, primarily because of the statutes
governing court review of zoning cases. Not only do statutes restrict
what a court can review, they also restrict the relief that can be
granted. The standard test for judicial review is, as noted previously,
whether the administrative body abused its discretion. There is
also the peripheral issue affecting court review of whether the liti-
gant has exhausted his administrative remedies before coming to
court.5 This standard test necessarily assumes a limited judicial role:
where the only function of the court is to determine whether or not
some administrative body has abused the broad discretion given it by
a statue or ordinance authorized under a state enabling act, the court
will only evaluate the decision of the administrative body insofar as it
is reasonable (or unreasonable) on the facts; the court will not ordi-
narily determine if the decision is wise, fair to the applicant, neces-
sary and so forth. This sort of decision-making is left to the board,
and it has been held many times that it is an abuse of discretion for
the court to make such a determination. 9
Yet the standard of substantive due process for testing the validity
of a zoning ordinance requires that a court make just such determi-
nations. The door appears wide open for the court system to begin
to exert a much more powerful influence in the administration of
zoning laws. This note will examine conventional judicial review,
both judge-made and statutorily authorized, and the much broader
scope of judicial review on constitutional grounds in recent cases.
I. CONVENTIONAL JUDICIAL REvIEW
A. Judge-made Doctrine
The conventional, narrow scope of judicial review in zoning cases,
as described above in relation to the "abuse of administrative dis-
cretion" test, is based on several doctrines. Perhaps the earliest of
these is the principle of the separation of powers between the various
branches of government. Since administrative bodies are historically
8. D. MANDELKER, MANAGING OUR URBAN ENVIRONBIENT 942-44 (2d ed.
1971); Note, Exhaustion of Remedies in Zoning Cases, 1964 WASH. U.L.Q. 368.
9. See, e.g., cases cited in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S.
365 (1926).
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part of the executive branch (although this historical position may
today be open to question because of the proliferation of bureau-
cratic bodies which often seem completely independent of the execu-
tive branch which supposedly governs them), the doctrine of separa-
tion of powers, together with the principle of checks and balances,
dictates that the judicial branch restrain the executive branch only
when, in a rough approximation, its actions get completely out of
hand.10 Another, more often articulated, doctrine is that the court
system is not properly equipped to conduct independent investiga-
tions into the actions of administrative bodies. More specifically, in
the area of administrative discretion in zoning, it is often said that
the courts should not become "super-zoners"; the legislature has made
a judgment, through its zoning ordinance enabling laws, allowing
communities to delegate administrative powers to boards of adjust-
ment (or other similar bodies) and the proper exercise of those
powers should not be subject to court attack.11 This sort of rationale
applies equally to court actions invalidating acts of administrative
bodies because of an abuse of discretion and to court actions which
attempt to redress the grievances of a citizen who has been denied
relief by administrative bodies. Another doctrine, somewhat periph-
eral to this limited scope of judicial review, is that of exhaustion of
administrative remedies, previously noted. In other words, in general
terms, a citizen who has been denied, for example, a building permit,
cannot ask a court to order the building commissioner to issue the
permit unless and until the citizen has pursued his grievance through
all administrative channels.12
Each of these doctrines, individually and in combination, has been
responsible, along with others less important, for restricting the scope
of judicial review of zoning decisions by administrative bodies. It
appears from the cases that the same standards are applicable to court
review of administrative bodies which have denied variances and to
review of constitutional challenges (until recently) to ordinances.3
While a court may describe the extent of its powers of review in a
variance case as determining whether the administrative body abused
10. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
11. See Comment, Exclusionary Zoning from a Regional Perspective, 1972
URBAaN L. ANN. 239, 243 n.21.
12. E.g., Bright v. City of Evanston, 10 Ill. 2d 178, 139 N.E.2d 270 (1956).
13. E.g., Ray Schools-Chicago, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 337 Ill. App. 312, 86
N.E.2d 139 (1949), where plaintiff made both challenges.
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its discretion or in a constitutional challenge case as determining
whether the ordinance in question is supportable under the police
power and the fifth and fourteenth amendments, the description of
the scope of review has remained the same for both: the "code"
words, "arbitrary, .... unreasonable" and "capricious," seem to have
been applied to both kinds of attack. Curiously, courts have until
recently regarded most cases which can be loosely labelled as "zoning
cases" as the same, although the issues involved may variously be
exhaustion of administrative remedy, correct standard for judicial
review of administrative agency actions or a direct constitutional
challenge to the ordinance itself. Consequently, no matter what form
of attack a litigant may take, the rationale for the decision has his-
torically been much the same.
Despite all of the above, however, it can be argued that a court is
not necessarily a "super-zoner" and is not usurping a legislative func-
tion when the court has before it one citizen who wishes to use his
single piece of property in a certain way. While it can be argued that
a court has insufficient fact-gathering capabilities and lacks expertise
in zoning matters, when the court has only one person before it and
can easily through pre-trial orders obtain all the relevant facts from
the citizen and from the administrative body, it can and should be
able to make as informed and legitimate a judgment as can an admin-
istrative body. In Mangel v. Village of Wilmette,24 an Illinois appel-
late court sanctioned such a technique. A similar approach has been
attempted by Michigan courts which have provided what appears to
be a unique remedy-they have granted injunctions prohibiting the
municipalities from interfering with the proposed use of the land.1 5
It is interesting to note that these courts have not rejected-or even
discussed-a separation of powers objection to these approaches. Per-
haps this reflects a tacit acceptance by courts that administrative or,
more pejoratively, bureaucratic, bodies do not come directly under
one of the three traditional branches of government, and thus can be
much more closely supervised by courts without the charge that the
courts are overstepping the bounds of judicial discretion, or "judi-
cially legislating."
Another, perhaps more basic, problem confronting judicial review
14. 115 I1. App. 2d 383, 253 N.E.2d 9 (1969).
15. Daraban v. Township of Redford, 383 Mich. 497, 176 N.W.2d 598 (1970);
Lacy v. City of Warren, 7 Mich. App. 105, 151 N.W.2d 245 (1967).
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of zoning cases is that courts are more often than not the last govern-
mental body to which citizens turn when they wish to obtain per-
mission to develop their land in a certain way (and this is nearly
always the factual background behind a zoning case, whether the
court action is a constitutional attack on the ordinance itself, an at-
tack on the administration of the ordinance in a particular case or
merely a request to reverse the action of the zoning body). Generally,
under pertinent statutory provisions, one must apply to the local
board of adjustment or equivalent body to obtain a variance from
the terms of the applicable zoning ordinance. A denial of the var-
iance, if the citizen wishes to contest the decision, usually requires an
appeal to another administrative body prior to court review of the
action of the initial administrative body. Thus, the court system does
not come in contact with the citizen until after his request has been
turned down by at least one administrative body. The function of the
court system becomes one of review, primarily because of the statutes
governing court action in zoning cases, limiting that action to a de-
termination of whether the administrative body abused its discretion
-normally a court cannot grant essentially administrative relief. The
fact that the court system in the whole process follows chronologically
the administrative process almost of necessity dictates review instead
of independent fact-finding. This sequence would likely result in
mere review of administrative actions even if statutes restricting court
action in zoning cases were not in existence.
Other than the Illinois and Michigan courts mentioned previously,
few courts have engaged in a comprehensive review of administrative
actions in zoning cases or have entertained direct challenges to ordi-
nances in the absence of statutes authorizing a broader scope of
judicial activity.
B. Statutory Authorization for More Comprehensive Review
A typical state statute permitting a more comprehensive scope of
review of administrative decisions relating to zoning is that of In-
diana,26 which permits a trial court to receive into evidence additional
factors to supplement the evidence adduced by the administrative
authority; thereupon, the trial court may affirm, reverse or modify
the order of the administrative body in whole or in part. 7 In
16. IND. ANN. STAT. § 53-788 (Burns Repl. 1964).
17. Id.
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O'Connor v. Overall Laundry, Inc.,18 however, an Indiana appellate
court held that the trial court may not conduct a trial de novo 19 and
completely reconsider the facts and the decision of the administrative
authority; since this was not permitted by the terms of the statute.2 0
At this point, it is important to distinguish what a court may do.
Under such a statute as Indiana's, the court has the power to do more
than merely affirm or reverse an administrative decision, considering
only the general rule relating to abuse of discretion and the like, dis-
cussed supra; the court may modify the administrative decision. With
respect to remedies, this type of statute is certainly more comprehen-
sive and significantly more conducive to effective judicial review of
decisions of administrative authorities. With respect to procedure,
however, this type of statute permits only a supplementation of the
evidence before the administrative body. One might surmise, in
retrospect, that the language of such a statute reflects, perhaps uncon-
sciously, a policy consideration of the legislature that there should be
a vestige of the time-sworn doctrine of the separation of powers. The
courts of Missouri 2' and Nebraska22 have made similar decisions
under this type of statute.
A more specific holding with respect to what the trial court may do
is found in Appeal of Fred Jones Co.,23 where the Oklahoma court
held that the trial court may make such orders as the board of adjust-
ment could have made.24 In Dooling's Windy Hill v. Zoning Board
of Adjustment,"- the Pennsylvania Supreme Court even authorized
the trial court to grant the applicant a variance.26 In both of these
states, the revelant statutes27 authorize the trial court to make a final
and independent disposition of the proceedings. A federal court in
the District of Columbia in Donovan v. Clarke'2 held that the power
18. 98 Ind. App. 29, 183 N.E. 134 (1932).
19. Id. at 34, 183 N.E. at 139.
20. Id.
21. Adams v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, 241 S.W.2d 35 (Mo. App. 1951).
22. Roncka v. Fogarty, 152 Neb. 467, 41 N.W.2d 745 (1950).
23. 203 Okla. 321, 220 P.2d 245 (1950).
24. Id. at 324, 220 P.2d at 248.
25. 371 Pa. 290, 89 A.2d 505 (1925).
26. Id. at 293, 89 A.2d at 508.
27. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 408 (1959); PA. STAT. ANN. fit. 53, § 30667
(Purdon 1957).
28. 223 F. Supp. 795 (D.D.C. 1963).
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to make a final, independent judgment rather than remanding the
case to the administrative body was within the equity powers of the
court.29 Imagine a court doing any of the foregoing without a statutel
This type of approach, however, has a distinct disadvantage:
because the trial court has simply reviewed the action of the admin-
istrative authority or has adduced additional evidence to supplement
the evidence taken by the administrative body, and has not actually
conducted a complete, original hearing on the merits of each case,
it is not in a good position to make a final, legitimate disposition of
a zoning matter. In other words, under statutes which direct the
principal emphasis of the trial court to review of administrative deci-
sions, the trial court is restricted in its powers to consider what might
be the most relevant evidence because that evidence was fully
presented and ruled upon at the administrative level. Further, this
procedure smacks of "judicial legislation" with all of the pejorative
connotations of that term because the court is using its judicial
powers to make a legislative or administrative determination. This
charge is particularly unfortunate when a court makes its determina-
tion partly on its own record and party on the record before the
administrative body-i.e., what the citizen gets is a hybrid determina-
don based on both administrative and judicial techniques.
Perhaps consequently, legislatures of several states have passed
statutes permitting a court to make a final determination only after
the trial court has made a completely independent investigation and
determination of all the issues in a zoning case or has conducted a
trial de novo. In Pincus v. Powers,30 the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania authorized a final determination by the trial court after a trial
de novo, as did the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New
York in Lemir Realty Co. v. Larkin.31
This procedure appears to be more satisfactory since the court has
an opportunity to conduct an investigation "untainted" by actions
and decisions of other governmental bodies, and such investigation is
required under the statutes. Thus, the objections to the first two types
of statutes on the basis of separation of powers and judicial legisla-
tion are met. The situation becomes essentially one of first impression
29. Id. at 797.
30. 376 Pa. 175, 101 A.2d 914 (1954). See also Appeal of Rolling Green Golf
Club, 374 Pa. 450, 97 A.2d 523 (1953); Appeal of Lindquist, 364 Pa. 561, 73
A.2d 378 (1950).
31. 8 App. Div. 2d 970, 190 N.Y.S.2d 952 (1959).
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for the court system: the action of the administrative body is for all
practical purposes ignored and the litigation is a repeat, with judicial
safeguards, of the procedure in the administrative body.
Despite broad language in the opinions which seemingly permits
sweeping remedies and in statutes which authorize comprehensive
review, there are recent, strong intimations that the court system will
not conduct rezoning, as this is a legislative or administrative preroga-
tive. (At this point, one should note that courts have said frequently
that to grant a variance in a particular situation would amount to
rezoning-calling granting variances rezoning simply creates a
rationale for refusing the requested relief. This, of course, is not
intended to imply that there is no difference between the two.32) For
example, in Exchange National Bank v. City of Waukegan,33 an
Illinois appellate court held that a trial court could not rezone.34 In
Gable v. Village of Hinsdale2 the same court authorized the use
requested by the plaintiff, but repeated the statement that courts will
not rezone. 36 Apparently disgusted with requests for variances, the
court in Gedmin v. City of Chicago37 stated that a trial court will not
rezone or unzone, but will only inquire if the proposed use is reason-
ableA3 The significance of this last Illinois decision appears to be a
recognition of substantially broader judicial review in zoning cases:
from a determination of whether or not the administrative body has
abused its discretion to a determination if the proposed use is reason-
able. Analyzing these cases together, one can conclude that Illinois
courts will not adhere to a traditional separation of powers rationale
for avoiding court decisions which might be held to usurp adminis-
trative functions, but the courts are not willing to exercise what they
consider purely administrative or legislative functions.
In considering the concept of comprehensive court review of ad-
ministrative agency decisions in zoning cases, one must constantly
keep in mind the effect on the process of the remedy a litigant uses to
32. An easy case would be where a developer wants a use variance to permit a
high-rise office building in a residential zone-no one would argue that granting
such a variance would not be rezoning.
33. 85 Ill. App. 2d 461, 229 N.E.2d 562 (1967).
34. Id. at 463, 229 N.E.2d at 564.
35. 87 I1. App. 2d 123, 230 N.E.2d 706 (1967).
36. Id. at 128, 230 N.E.2d at 711.
37. 88 INl. App. 2d 294, 232 N.E.2d 573 (1967).
38. Id. at 300, 232 N.E.2d at 579.
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get into court in the first place. Rules of evidence, scope of review
and other significant aspects of the case may differ if the lawsuit is
for a declaratory judgment as to the effect of the ordinance, manda-
mus, prohibition, injunction or simply attacks the action of the
administrative body as arbitrary or capricious. A detailed analysis of
the judicial remedies available to a person aggrieved by the action of
an administrative body is beyond the scope of this note.3
C. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
A peripheral problem in the administrative review of zoning laws
arises when a prospective litigant wishes to make a direct challenge
to either a zoning ordinance itself or to the action of an administra-
tive body pursuant to that ordinance. If a litigant goes to court with-
out first applying to the administrative body for relief from the terms
of an ordinance, he is almost always met with the defense that he has
not exhausted his administrative remedies. For example, a Florida
district court of appeals in Wood v. Twin Lakes Mobile Homes
Village, Inc.40 held that a litigant must apply for a variance under the
ordinance before he can challenge the constitutionality of the ordi-
nance. However, the Florida court qualified this rule in Mayflower
Property, Inc. v. City of Fort Lauderdale41 by saying that a litigant
need not pursue fruitless administrative remedies prior to a consti-
tutional attack on an ordinance. 42
The New York courts have allowed direct challenges to zoning
ordinances apparently only if the administrative agency could not
have granted the requested relief anyway. 43 Whether this means that
39. For a discussion of the remedies in Illinois see Scott, Judicial Review of
Zoning Decisions in Illinois, 59 ILL. BAR J. 228, 230 (1970). See also Mandelker,
Delegation of Power and Function in Zoning Administration, 1963 WAsH. U.L.Q.
60, 68-71, for an analysis of cases from other jurisdictions where the courts have
granted administrative-type relief to applicants for variances from zoning ordi-
nances. Similar Massachusetts cases are discussed in Ryckman, Judicial and Ad-
ministrative Review in Massachusetts Zoning and Subdivision Control Cases, 52
MAss. L.Q. 297 (1967); Arkansas cases are discussed in Gitelman, Judicial Re-
view of Zoning in Arkansas, 23 ARK. L. Rxv. 22 (1969).
40. 123 So. 2d 738 (Fla. App. 1960).
41. 137 So. 2d 849 (Fla. App. 1962).
42. Id. at 852.
43. Mandelker, supra note 39, at 70-71 n.28.
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the outcome depends on what type of relief is requested or what
type of relief should have been requested is not dear.44
Illinois courts have taken a similar view. Howard v. Lawton45 and
Sulzberger v. County of Peoria4" both decided that the litigant need
not take "unending administrative steps." 47
The Pennsylvania legislature passed a comprehensive statute4
obviating administrative application prior to a challenge to the
validity of an ordinance except:
(1) When the power to grant relief against the challenged
provision is lodged in any administrative agency or officer and
the application is necessary to a decision upon the appropriate
relief ...
(2) When an application is necessary to define the contro-
versy and to aid in its proper disposition. An application... is
not necessary . . .when the challenge is addressed solely to a
minimum lot size or maximum density requirement. . . .or site
planning or subdivision improvement matters ... [or] building
or land use matters.49
From the language of this statute, it would seem that the traditional
defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies will not be
favored in zoning cases in Pennsylvania.
These judicial and legislative attitudes lead directly into the new
technique of attack through constitutional means on zoning ordi-
nances, for they clear the way through the "thicket" of conventional
defenses to direct challenges.
With respect to the possible defense of failure to exhaust admin-
istrative remedies in zoning cases, the courts of Florida, New York
and Illinois (and Pennsylvania, with the aid of the statute noted
44. Clearly an administrative agency cannot declare an ordinance unconstitu-
tional, if that is the attack on it. If, however, the attack could have asked for a
variance, and in the alternative, asked for a declaration of unconstitutionality,
the administrative agency would have jurisdiction because it does have the power
to grant a variance; it would simply ignore the constitutional attack. The New
York cases do not decide what the challenger must do, but it seems likely that
they would not allow a litigant to circumvent administrative procedures merely
because he does not allege what he really wants, a variance, but he does allege
that the ordinance is unconstitutional.
45. 22 Ill. 2d 331, 175 N.E.2d 556 (1961).
46. 29 Ill. 2d 532, 194 N.E.2d 287 (1963).
47. See Scott, supra note 39, at 229.
48. PA. STAT. ANN. tit 53, § 10801 (Purdon Supp. 1972).
49. Id.
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
above) are much more receptive to the challenges of individual liti-
gants to zoning ordinances.50
With this background of conventional judicial review of zoning,
and particularly the standards and applicable defenses that have
been used by the courts, one can approach the relatively new tech-
nique of direct constitutional attack on ordinances with a much
better perspective in observing what a radical change has occurred
in court treatment of such challenges during recent years.
H. TBE EMERGING STANDARD OF REvIEw
Consideration of various direct attacks on zoning ordinances must
begin with a delineation of the various types of ordinances under
attack, as well as the standards and methods of resolution used by
courts in reaching their decisions. The ordinances can be generally
categorized as follows:
A. Ordinances Specifically Prohibiting Certain Uses
Perhaps the dearest statement of the philosophical and practical
basis for sustaining an attack upon an ordinance which specifically
prohibits a particular use is the dissenting opinion of Justice Hall of
the New Jersey Supreme Court in Vickers v. Township Committee.5'
The majority opinion in the case sustained an ordinance prohibiting
mobile homes in industrial zones, generally on the ground that the
ordinance was a valid exercise of the legislative power to provide for
the general welfare. In his dissent, however, Justice Hall questioned
the rationale of the majority and seemed to state that there should be
a place in the community for mobile homes: "There is nothing to
indicate that a mobile home park is not a legally and factually
appropriate use somewhere in such a scene. To hold that it is not
exceeds the bounds of reason."52 Justice Hall seems to say that if the
use is appropriate, it is unreasonable not to provide for it. A similar
holding, in Illinois, is found in Gedmin v. City of Chicago5 3 where the
50. But see Note, Exhaustion of Remedies in Zoning Cases, supra note 8, at
368.
51. 37 N.J. 232, 252-70, 181 A.2d 129, 140-50 (1962), appeal dismissed, 371
U.s. 233 (1963).
52. 37 N.J. at 270, 181 A.2d at 150.
53. 88 I1. App. 2d 294, 232 N.E.2d 573 (1967).
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court said that the only inquiry is whether the proposed use is reason-
able.5'
The test of reasonableness of use thus begins to supplant that of
evaluation of administrative action or legislative authority. In Penn-
sylvania, however, in National Land & Investment Co. v. Kohn,55 a
court articulated a more stringent (on administrative agencies)
standard: "A zoning ordinance whose primary purpose is to prevent
the entrance of newcomers in order to avoid future burdens, economic
and otherwise, upon the administration of public services and facil-
ities can not be held valid."'  The court proceeded to strike down a
four-acre minimum lot size per dwelling unit ordinance as unconsti-
tutional. Pennsylvania courts have struck down, as unconstitutional,
ordinances prohibiting flashing signs,5 7 billboards s and quarrying
within municipal limits.- One might conclude that the Pennsylvania
courts do not look kindly upon absolute prohibitions of certain uses.
The technique of injunctions restraining municipalities from
enforcing ordinances and permitting the plaintiffs in such cases to
proceed with their proposed uses, without interference from the
municipalities, has been used by Michigan courts in Daraban v.
Township of Redford,60 House v. City of Bloomfield Hills-l and Lacy
v. City of VarrenA2 Yet, in Krause v. City of Royal Oak,63 a Mich-
igan appellate court reversed a trial court which had enjoined the
city from enforcing a zoning ordinance placing plaintiff's prop-
erty in a single-family use zone because the court found insufficient
evidence to rebut the presumption of validity of the ordinance.
It has been argued that when a municipality has totally prohibited
certain uses, a court may look to the proposed use of the land to see
54. Id. at 300, 232 N.E.2d at 579.
55. 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965).
56. Id. at 532, 215 A.2d at 612.
57. In re Ammon R. Smith Auto Co., 423 Pa. 493, 223 A.2d 683 (1966).
58. Norate Corp. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 417 Pa. 397, 207 A.2d 890
(1965).
59. Exton Quarries, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 425 Pa. 43, 228 A.2d
169 (1967).
60. 383 MAich. 497, 176 N.W.2d 598 (1970).
61. 18 Mich. App. 184, 171 N.W.2d 36 (1969).
62. 7 Mich. App. 105, 151 N.W.2d 245 (1967).
63. 11 Mich. App. 183, 160 N.W.2d 769 (1968).
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if that use is the most appropriate, and then allow it.64 Illinois courts
have followed that procedure. 5 However, it is a long way from the
standard of reasonableness of use to the standard of substantive due
process to test the conflict between zoning ordinances and proposed
uses of property. The Appellate Division of New Jersey's Superior
Court, however, made that step in Gabe Collins Realty, Inc. v. City
of Margate City.66 There the city had zoned certain areas for single-
family residence, and the zoning ordinance defined "family" as one
or more related persons, or not more than two unrelated persons,
occupying an individual dwelling unit. Plaintiffs argued that the
classification of family in the ordinance was an arbitrary and unwar-
ranted restriction of their use of their own private property. The
New Jersey court held: ". . . as written, the provision impugned is
void as an arbitrary and unreasonable restriction upon plaintiffs'
right to use or rent their properties, contrary to the constitutional
requirements of substantive due process." 67 As noted at the beginning
of this paper, this sort of analysis marks a radical departure from the
principles of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,08 and a return to
the principles enunciated in the substantive due process cases of the
early part of this century.
B. Ordinances Making No Provision for Certain Uses
A different problem is faced by the landowner when his municipal-
ity's zoning ordinances have various zones, but make no provisions
at all for certain uses. In Appeal of Girsh,69 the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court held the municipality would not be permitted to have
a zoning scheme which made no reasonable provision for apart-
ments.70 The rationale of this case seems to hearken back to the
reasoning of Justice Hall in his dissent in the Vickersel case, discussed
64. See note 11 supra.
65. E.g., Sinclair Pipe Line Co. v. Village of Richton Park, 19 Ill. 2d 370, 167
N.E.2d 406 (1960); Mangel v. Village of Wilmette, 115 Ill. App. 2d 383, 253
N.E.2d 9 (1969); High Meadows Park, Inc. v. City of Aurora, 112 Ill. App. 2d
220, 250 N.E.2d 517 (1969); Gedmin v. City of Chicago, 88 Il. App. 2d 294, 232
N.E.2d 573 (1967).
66. 112 N.J. Super. 341, 271 A.2d 430 (App. Div. 1970).
67. Id. at 343, 271 A.2d at 431.
68. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
69. 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970).
70. Id. at 243, 263 A.2d at 398.
71. 37 N.J. at 252-70, 181 A.2d at 140-50.
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supra. If it is reasonable that a community provide for certain uses,
it is unreasonable if it does not. This rationale fits neatly into the
substantive due process test of the Gabe Collins72 case: it is not only
unreasonable not to provide for certain uses, it is also unconstitu-
tional. (It would seem that whether the court decides that not pro-
viding for a certain use is unreasonable or denies substantive due
process, the result is the same-the community may not do it.)
A related problem occurs when a municipality zones out uses such
as apartments in a situation with racial overtones. Such a case is Park
View Heights Corp. v. City of Black Jack,7 3 in which a private de-
veloper secured a federal loan to build low-income housing in a
previously unincorporated area. The municipality incorporated and
promptly passed a zoning ordinance excluding the proposed project
trom approved uses. The ordinance was challenged on constitutional
grounds, but the federal trial court dismissed the case on motion of
the defendant, who argued that plaintiffs did not have standing to
raise the constitutional question that the purpose and effect of the
ordinance were to exclude persons of moderate and/or lower income
from the city.7 4 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals recently re-
versed the trial court's opinion holding, among other things, that
plaintiffs did have standing to raise the constitutional question. 5
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE EMERGING STANDARD OF JUDICIAL REviEW
This new technique of examining zoning decisions (ordinances
and their application to specific fact situations) bodes ill to con-
ventional judicial and administrative wisdom in their interaction in
the administration of the zoning process. The standard of judicial
review appears to have become one in which the court system will
have more authority to overturn administrative and legislative deter-
minations, merely because the test has become one of substantive due
process. The fact of the matter is that constitutional challenges to
such determinations have suddenly become successful. This state of
affairs is satisfactory to the individual landowner for he now is able to
have a greater chance of using his property as he desires-the courts
seem more willing to listen to his arguments. For persons particularly
72. 112 N.J. Super. 341, 271 A.2d 430 (App. Div. 1970).
73. 335 F. Supp. 899 (E.D. Mo. 1972).
74. Id. at 903.
75. 467 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir. 1972).
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interested in civil liberties and for persons who dislike or distrust gov-
ernmental decisions, this new standard will be eminently satisfactory.
But what about conventional planning techniques? What about
the majority will which is supposedly represented in legislative and
administrative determinations implementing zoning ordinances? It
would be an understatement that these forces and influences in com-
munity development are greatly affected by this new standard of
judicial review. Planning a community would be a practically useless
task if a developer can go to court and get the plan thrown out, little
by little, on constitutional grounds.
IV. CONCLUSION
One of the first points that can be made about this new standard
for judicial review is that some of the cases have definite racial over-
tones which may have strongly influenced the courts in making
their decisions. Certainly this can be said about the Park View
Heights case, since there the municipality zoned out a low-income
housing project which had already received a federal loan guarantee.
However, other cases merely have what may be loosely termed "civil
liberties" overtones. Clearly, it is difficult to generalize in any mean-
ingful way about these cases. Whatever the rationale for deciding
zoning cases in this manner, it can be clearly seen that this standard
for judicial review is a radical departure from judicial practice as it
has existed since the Euclid case.
To the writer, the principal significance of this new standard is that
it subjects administrative and/or legislative determinations to a truly
discredited judicial philosophy, substantive due process. As was
noted at the beginning of this note, that philosophy was rejected by
the Supreme Court of the United States half a century ago. More
importantly, this philosophy injects the court system into an arena in
which it is ill-equipped to make legitimate judgments. To avoid
belaboring the obvious, perhaps the best conclusion to this note
would be a quotation from the classic dissenting opinion of Mr.
Justice Black in Adamson v. California,76 where the late Justice wrote:
... to pass upon the constitutionality of statutes by looking to
the particular standards enumerated in the Bill of Rights and
other parts of the Constitution is one thing; to invalidate
statutes because of application of "natural law" deemed to be
above and undefined by the Constitution is another.
76. 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947).
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In the one instance, courts proceeding within clearly marked
constitutional boundaries seek to execute policies written into
the Constitution; in the other they roam at will in the limitless
area of their own beliefs as to the reasonableness and actually
select policies, a responsibility which the Constitution entrusts to
the legislative representatives of the people77
Referring once again to the cases of the Supreme Court which re-
jected substantive due process objections to legislation,78 it cannot
seriously be argued that courts today, in their new standards for
judicial review of zoning decisions, are not doing what Justice Black
inveighed against in the Adamson case. And it cannot seriously be
argued that the effect of such judicial reasoning and decisions will not
recreate the problems that the substantive due process cases created in
the early part of this century.
The real issue here is the role of the judicial system in the whole
process. Given the principle of separation of powers embodied in the
Constitution of the United States and the very real dangers in an
omnipotent judiciary, should not the judicial system return to its
earlier position, discussed in this note, of review of administrative
and/or legislative determinations in zoning cases? In most cases, the
answer appears to be a definite yes. 79
77. Id. at 91-92.
78. See note 4 supra.
79. Subject, of course, to serious and legitimate civil rights claims which have
allegedly been affected by administrative and/or legislative determinations.
Washington University Open Scholarship
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol1973/iss1/8
